Modeling alternatives to exponential discounting by Musau, Andrew
Modeling Alternatives to Exponential Discounting
Andrew Musau
Master thesis in business administration
University of Agder
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
2009
Acknowledgement
I am deeply indebted to the thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Jochen Jungeilges. In
particular, I would like to acknowledge his guidance from the selection of the topic
to the nal draft, insights on the subject matter, useful comments and suggestions.
All the errors contained herein remain my own.
Contents
Abstract 2
1 Introduction 4
2 Discounting Functions 6
2.0.1 Denition and Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.0.2 Motives for Discounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 The Discounted Utility Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1 DU Model Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2 Desirable Properties of Exponential Discounting . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.3 DU Model Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 The Quasi-Hyperbolic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.1 Analysis of Phelps and Pollak's specication . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2 Laibson's specication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Hyperbolic Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.1 Ainslie's functional form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 Herrnstein and Mazur's functional form . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.3 Loewenstein and Prelec's functional form . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 An IPD Model under non-exponential discounting 29
3.1 Model description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Analysis of equilibrium conditions in the 2-Firm IPD Model. . . . . . 32
4 Applications to wage theory: Eciency wages 37
4.1 The Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Shapiro-Stiglitz model under non-exponential discounting . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Equilibrium Unemployment under non-exponential discounting . . . . 43
4.3.1 General Equilibrium in the exponential case . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3.2 General Equilibrium in the non-exponential case . . . . . . . . 46
1
5 Summary and Conclusion 54
6 Appendix 56
6.1 Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.2 Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.3 Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
References 67
2
Abstract
One area that is often overlooked by economists and social scientists is dis-
counting. Most economic models of intertemporal choice make use of Samuel-
son's (1937) DU model which leads to an exponential discount function. Diver-
gences from what economic modelling predicts and empirical ndings are on the
most part attributed to factors other than the discount function employed. We
review the literature on the DU model and identify its behavioral anomalies.
We look into suggested quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic models that in part ac-
count for these anomalies. We analyze an innite IPD game and demonstrate
that under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, cooperation emerges as an SPE at a
higher level of the discount factor. We further demonstrate that the unemploy-
ment equilibrium in the Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) shirking model is not static
under both hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Keywords: intertemporal, exponential, quasi-hyperbolic, hyperbolic.
1 Introduction
Economic decision making involves an analysis of expected payos over some time
period. Hence, a critical issue that arises is what value an agent assigns to the
present relative to the future and the tradeos she makes between near-term payos
and payos that are far into the future. Decisions regarding the timing of a rm's
entry into a new market, for example, are based on the tradeos between the value
of waiting and the benets from moving quickly. The higher the current dividends,
residual resource value, and interest rate the greater the likelihood of entry now
(Folta & Miller 2002, p. 662). To take another example, in an innitely iterated
prisoner's dilemma (IPD), the evolution of cooperation depends on the magnitude of
the time discount factor. Cooperation is easier to sustain when players have a high
time discount factor (Shy 1995, p. 33).
Discounting thus is central in intertemporal choice but an equally important consid-
eration is what discounting model to employ, that is, one that adequately represents
the preferences of an agent across time. Samuelson's (1937) Discounted Utility (DU)
model is the standard discounting model in most economic analysis of intertemporal
choice. The DU model represents an agent as selecting between choices based on
a weighted sum of utilities: the weights being represented as discount factors. The
main underlying assumption of the DU model is that the discount factor is constant
over time. For example, if an agent believes that the utility derived from receiving
a dollar falls by 5 percent from time t to t + 1 , then its utility would be 5 percent
less at t + 2 in relation to t + 1, 5 percent less at t + 3 in relation to t + 2 and so
on. This assumption leads to an exponential discounting function which is commonly
used in nancial calculations of present value. Part of the success of the DU model as
the enduring model of choice for economists and social scientists modeling social or
economic behavior lies in its simplicity and mathematical tractability. Employing the
model allows for an analytical solution even when dealing with an innite series of
payos since it has the convenient property of convergence over time. In addition, the
model implies that agents have consistent time preferences or that their preferences
remain the same over time. This is in line with rational choice theory and makes the
model rather convenient for use.
However, a number of anomalies in the DU model have been identied and its assump-
tions and implications have been widely criticized. Empirical studies in experimental
and behavioral economics and psychology e.g., (Thaler 1981, Benzion, Rapoport &
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Yagil 1989, Slonim, Carlson & Bettinger 2007) suggest that animals and human be-
ings in general appear to discount the future hyperbolically. This means that they
are extremely impatient about payos that occur in the near future and more pa-
tient about payos that occur further into the future. Thus, they appear to discount
the near-term more than exponentially and the long-term less. In addition, economic
models of preference reversals and time inconsistency e.g., (Strotz 1956) challenge the
DU model and call into question the empirical validity of conclusions drawn based on
modeling agents as exponential discounters.
Accordingly, researchers in economics and the social sciences have taken note of the
DU model's apparent lack of empirical validity sparking huge interest on alternative
formulations. Among the most prominent include Phelps & Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1997) quasi-hyperbolic model, Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987) hyperbolic model,
and Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) hyperbolic model. A search on Science Direct, one
of the world's largest online collections of published scientic research shows an over
800 percent increase in the number of published articles on hyperbolic discounting in
the past decade alone, indicating that increased interest in the topic is a relatively
new phenomenon.
In our analysis, we examine the problem of cooperation in an innite IPD and
demonstrate that under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE) is attained at a higher level of the discount factor. Further, we analyze
the Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) shirking model and demonstrate that wages set un-
der the assumption of exponential discounting may not eectively deter shirking in
the presence of hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting employees. Incorporating
Solow (1956), we demonstrate that the unemployment equilibrium in the Shapiro &
Stiglitz model is not static under both hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we highlight anomalies in the DU
model and look into suggested quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic alternatives. In Sec-
tion 3, we model the interaction between two rms in the form of an innite IPD and
analyze how the equilibrium conditions necessary for sustaining cooperation change as
we move from exponential to non-exponential discounting. Eventually, in Section 4 we
analyze the Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) shirking model under non exponential discount-
ing. Incorporating Solow (1956), we investigate how the unemployment equilibrium
changes if we shift from the standard exponential functional form. Our ndings are
summarized in Section 5.
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2 Discounting Functions
2.0.1 Denition and Properties
The term time discounting can be broadly dened to include any reason for placing
less concern on a future consequence including factors that reduce the expected utility
generated by a future consequence, such as risk or uncertainty. In more specic terms,
it can be dened as the fall in the value of a reward as a function of increasing delay or
decreasing probability (for a review, see McKerchar, Green, Myerson, Pickford, Hill
& Stout (2009); for a broader elaboration, see Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue
(2002)).
In most analytical economic models, the idea of discounting is compressed into a single
construct, that is, the discounting function.1 Thus at the onset, it is appropriate to
dene a general version of a discounting function before proceeding to specic forms.
Most discounting functions of intertemporal choice can be expressed in the following
way:2
D() =
 1Y
t=0
1
1 + t
(1)
where D() is the discount function (which can take any form) and t is the discount
rate at time t or the discount rate between t and t+1. Axtell & McRae (2006) present
two \necessary conditions" which a function must satisfy inorder to be a discounting
function. These are summarized below:
Axiom 1: D(0) = 1, that is, no discounting of the present;
Axiom 2: D(t) must be strictly monotone decreasing, D0(t) < 0.
Both properties suggest that earlier nominal payos are preferable to later ones given
that both are equal in magnitude. In particular, Axiom 2 implies that the value at
two dierent future periods is always at least as large at the nearer time. One way
of examining this is by way of a simple oer wherein you consider a choice between
1To cause no confusion, we do not dierentiate between the terms discount function and dis-
counting function.
2see Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue (2002) for a broader review.
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receiving a given amount of money today, say $100 or the same nominal amount
in a year's time. Naturally, you would choose the former given the opportunity
which gives the properties some intuitive basis.3 Thus, as is evident, the need for
discounting arises from the notion that individuals in general have a bias towards
present consumption over future consumption, ceteris paribus. There is a wide array
of literature addressing this phenomenon and we briey review the psychological
motives underlying this form of time preference as well as other justications for
discounting.
2.0.2 Motives for Discounting
One of the most cited arguments for discounting is the tendency inherent in human
beings to attach less importance to future payos even if there is no rational reason
to do so. This fact of human psychology often referred to as `pure time discounting'
can trace its origins as far back as the emergence of intertemporal choice as a distinct
topic.4 Proponents of this view include Rae (1834, p.120) who contends that human
beings have a passion for present consumption and face great discomfort from delaying
utility gained from this consumption:
Such pleasures as may now be enjoyed generally awaken a passion strongly prompting
to the partaking of them. The actual presence of the immediate object of desire in
the mind by exciting the attention, seems to rouse all the faculties, as it were to x
their view on it, and leads them to a very lively conception of the enjoyments which
it oers to their instant possession.5
Pigou (1932, Pt.1 ch.2 sec.3) refers to it as a `brute fact of human psychology' and
`a psychological frailty' - a defect of the `telescopic faculty' and maintains the in-
nate nature of the phenomenon. Other proponents who have stressed this point in
their works include philosophers Sidgwick (1907, Bk.4 ch.1) and Rawls (1972, sec.45).
However, it should be noted that there is no uniform support for this argument among
economists. The most notable criticism comes from Ramsey (1928, p.543) who terms
it as a `practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness
3Perhaps it would have been better to state that given the choice, a rational agent would choose
the former to the latter but such an assumption is always implicit.
4It is widely noted that economist John Rae invented the topic of intertemporal choice following
the publication of The Sociological Theory of Capital in 1834. This was a follow up on Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations and sought to determine why wealth diered among nations (Fredrick,
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002, pp.352-53).
5The Sociological Theory of Capital, cited in Loewenstein (2007, p.60)
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of the imagination'.6
A second justication for discounting and one that is more appealing to rational
minded individuals relates to uncertainty and risk. Unlike the previous which focuses
on the psychological make up of human beings, this argument contends that there
exists some exogenous factors which bring about the need for discounting. Absent
from these factors, equal treatment of past and present or zero discounting would
prevail. To take an example, a risk premium is included in the interest rate that a bank
charges on a loan to a borrower. In this instance, the bank is discounting expected
future receipts to account for the possibility of default or credit risk on the part of the
borrower resulting from various sources such as an unexpected increase in the rate of
ination, adverse conditions caused by unanticipated changes in regulations, business
climate, etc. One of the most common risk factors cited is death, `for reproductive
rewards, the organism may die before the reward is realized' (Sozou & Seymour
2003, p.1047).7 Mill (1848, Bk1 Ch.11) identies other factors related to risk and
uncertainty and their eects on an individual's choices:
In weighing the future against the present, the uncertainty of all things future is
a leading element; and that uncertainty is of very dierent degrees. \All circum-
stances" therefore, \increasing the probability of the provision we make for futurity
being enjoyed by ourselves or others, tend" justly and reasonably \to give strength
to the eective desire of accumulation. Thus a healthy climate or occupation, by in-
creasing the probability of life, has a tendency to add to this desire. When engaged in
safe occupations, and living in healthy countries, men are much more apt to be frugal,
than in unhealthy or hazardous occupations, and in climates pernicious to human life.
Sailors and soldiers are prodigals. In the West Indies, New Orleans, the East Indies,
the expenditure of the inhabitants is profuse. The same people, coming to reside in
the healthy parts of Europe, and not getting into the vortex of extravagant fashion,
live economically. War and pestilence have always waste and luxury among the other
evils that follow in their train.8
In this instance, Mill implies that an individual who is exposed to greater risk would
discount the future more and this is reected through maximizing present consump-
6references cited in (Goodin 1982, pp.54-55). We recommend that you review full article for a
broader discussion of justications for discounting.
7Ultimately, the fact that an individual is a mortal being and there is a positive relationship
between the progression of time and the probability of death, it is reasonable to conclude that
ceteris paribus, an earlier payo is preferable to a later one.
8The Principles of Political Economy, cited in Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue (2002, p.353)
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tion.9
Another key justication for discounting relates to cost. Specically, the argument
contends that there is an opportunity cost to delaying present consumption and this
can be viewed in terms of the next best alternative forgone. If we revert back to our
earlier example wherein you had a choice between receiving $100 today or the same
nominal amount in a year's time, an opportunity cost of accepting the latter can
be the interest that you would have earned had you accepted to receive the money
today and deposited it in an interest bearing account for the duration of a year. A
major proponent of this argument is Baumol (1970, p.274)10 , who claims that `the
correct discount rate is the opportunity cost in terms of the potential rate of return on
alternative uses on the resources that would be utilized by the project' (See Goodin
1982, pp.58-60). The idea that one should use the prevailing risk-free rate of interest
to discount a future payo or reward primarily emanates from this argument. As
Baumol argues, a rm that is evaluating a stream of future payos resulting from a
project should discount such payos using a rate that is equal to the rate of return
that the rm's resources would have earned had they not been employed in that
particular project. In the same manner, an individual who has no ideas of what to
do with $100 apart from immediate consumption can do no worse than investing the
money at the risk free rate of interest. Thus, from an economic point of view at least,
the opportunity cost argument can be viewed as the most orthodox justication for
discounting.
A nal major justication for discounting relates to the concept of diminishing marginal
utility (DMU). In very simple terms, this is the idea that as an individual increases
consumption of one good ceteris paribus, there is a decline in the marginal utility
she derives from consuming additional units of the same good. If we allow for the
progression of time, then we can extend the DMU argument over dierent generations
of agents. In eect, given that utility is not invariant over time, there is a shift in the
preferences of an individual or society from one period to the next leading to DMU as
consumption increases. According to (Arrow 1976, p.122) this argument is especially
relevant as it pertains to an emerging economy:
9Mill's conclusion is not extraordinary in any way. In the US for example where life expectancy
is over 75, most employees maintain their 401(k) accounts until retirement although they may opt
to liquidate part or all assets in the accounts before then.
10Baumol of course is more famous for his model of the transactions demand for money. For a
further insight see The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 66, pp.545-56)
9
In a growing economy, where people will be generally better o in the future, di-
minishing marginal utility implies that they would derive more satisfaction from any
given unit of a good now (when they have less) than later (when they will have more
anyway). Discounting is to be encouraged - and saving shunned - in order to avoid
`redistributing income from a present that is relatively poor to a future relatively rich.'
In the following sections, we review specic forms of discounting functions and iden-
tify their characteristics, advantages and drawbacks. We begin our review with the
DU model and then progress to more recent quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic speci-
cations.
2.1 The Discounted Utility Model
The DU framework developed by economist Paul Samuelson (1937) is the standard
model for representing intertemporal preferences.11 Since its introduction, the model
has dominated economic analysis of intertemporal choice (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992,
573).12 The model states that for a given consumption prole (c1; c2:::::; cN), where
c1 denotes consumption in period 1, c2 in period 2, and so on, the time-separable in-
tertemporal utility function denoted U(c1; c2:::::; cN) can be expressed simply as a sum
of discounted cardinal instantaneous utility functions for each period,  1u(c ) ( 2
Z+): Formally,
U(c1; c2; :::::; cN) =
NX
=1
 1u(c ): (2)
This represents the functional form proposed by Samuelson wherein  is a time dis-
count parameter.13 The unique characteristic of the DU model is that the rate of
discount of future utilities is a constant. The discount rate, denoted r, and the
discount factor are expressed in the following way:
11Samuelson was suggesting an alternative multi-period model of intertemporal choice in an article
titled A Note on Measurement of Utility (1937) and in the process making the point that representing
tradeos at dierent points in time necessitated a cardinal measure of utility.
12Further credit for the popularization of the DU model should be extended to Koopmans (1960)
for his axiomatic derivations of the model. For a review see Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impa-
tience, Econometrica 18 (1960), p 207-309.
13In the case of continuous time, the DU model can be expressed in the following way:
U(c1; c2; :::::; cN ) =
R N
=1
e r( 1)u(c )
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 =
1
1 + r
and r =
1

  1 (3)
Thus, r is a parameter representing the agent's preferences or the rate at which she
discounts the future.14 Incorporating (3) into (2), we can restate (2) in the following
way:
U(c1; c2; :::::; cN) =
NX
=1
 1
1 + r
 1
u(c ): (4)
Expanding (4), we have
U(c1; c2; :::; cN) = u(c1) +
u(c2)
1 + r
+ :::+
u(cN)
(1 + r)N 1
: (5)
From (5), we have the familiar representation of the DU model as is presented in most
literature. Taking the equation in isolation, it is evident that the DU model leads to
an exponential discounting function where the per-period discount factor is constant
and equal to 1
1+r
or . Proof: See Appendix- Section 6.1 A2
2.1.1 DU Model Assumptions
We can identify six main assumptions that the DU model makes. These are summa-
rized below:
1. Agents have a positive rate of time preference, that is they prefer to receive
a payo sooner rather than later. In terms of the discount factor,  2 (0; 1)
implying the less the agent values the future, the closer is the discount factor to
0 and the future is never valued more than the present,  < 1; 8  ( 2 (0;1)).
2. The rate of discount of future utilities is a constant, that is the discount factor,
14Shy (1995) interprets the parameter  as the present value of one dollar to be received in the
next period. If we assume a world with perfect capital markets, then r will adjust to equal the real
interest rate (p.29)
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, is constant and applicable to each and every period.
3. Utility independence, that is no relation exists between utility in one period and
every other period. The model explicitly assumes that total utility is simply
a sum of discounted utility functions for each period. Hence, apart from that
which is dictated by discounting, the distribution of utility across time makes
no dierence.
4. Independence of consumption, that is consumption in one period does not aect
or is not aected by consumption in each and every other period. Specically,
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in two given periods 
and 
0
is independent of consumption in period 
00
or putting it in another way,
watching a particular movie on two consecutive days, say Monday and Tuesday
should not aect your preference for watching the same movie over a choice of
others on the third day, Wednesday or on any other day (Fredrick, Loewenstein
& O'Donoghue 2002, p.357).
5. Stationary instantaneous utility, that is the utility function is constant across
time implying that the preferences of an individual do not change over time.
6. Independence of discounting from consumption, that is the discount function
or rate of time preference is constant across all consumption forms. Hence,
preferences of an individual remain the same when comparing her choices across
a diverse array of consumption forms or stated dierently, discounting is same
for food as it is for leisure, money, etc. (Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue
2002, p.358)
Before identifying anomalies in the DU model, we rst explore its mathematically
desirable properties that make it convenient for use in analysis of intertemporal choice.
2.1.2 Desirable Properties of Exponential Discounting
One appealing property of exponential discounting is that it leads to dynamic consis-
tency, that is, preferences that do not change over time. As an example, we consider
an individual who given a choice prefers to add m units to her consumption at time t
over adding n units (n > m) at a later time t
0
. Given a constant initial consumption
in every period which we denote c and utility which we denote u, we have:
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u(c+m)t + u(c)t
0
> u(c)t + u(c+ n)t
0
: (6)
If we divide through by t, we have:
u(c+m)  u(c) > (u(c+ n)  u(c))t0 t: (7)
Comparing (6) and (7) above tells us that the preference between the 2 consumption
adjustments is just simply a function of the separating absolute time interval, that is
(t
0   t).
Taking another example, we consider a rm that identies an investment project
wherein it has to incur an initial cost C at time t + 2 and earn a return R at time
t+3. We further suppose that the company evaluates the project at time t and nds
that it is worth pursuing since it generates a positive net present value or in formal
terms:
 C + 2R > 0: (8)
If the company chooses not to pursue the project at time t and waits for the next
period, i.e., t+ 1, the project will still be worth pursuing since:
 C + R > 0: (9)
To prove that the above is true, we only have to note that (9) is just (8) multiplied
by 1

. This stationarity property evident in both examples above is unique to the
exponential discounting and thereby makes it extremely attractive especially in the
eld of rational choice theory.
13
A second appealing property of exponential discounting is its mathematical tractabil-
ity. The function allows for an analytical solution when summing an innite series of
payos such as may be encountered in an innite IPD since the series converges:
1 + + 2 + 3 + ::: =
1X
t=0
t =
1
1   Proof: See Appendix - Section 6.1 A1
(10)
These two key properties in particular have contributed to the popularity of expo-
nential discounting as the standard mode of discounting among economists and social
scientists. Figure 1 is a plot of an exponential discount function for dierent values
of . The dashed line represents the theoretical limit case wherein  = 1, implying
zero discounting. We next explore anomalies inherent in this form of discounting.
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2.1.3 DU Model Anomalies
Samuelson (1937) when proposing the DU model recognized inadequacies inherent in
the assumptions as they pertain to the real world. On more than one occasion, he
stressed the `arbitrariness' of these assumptions even to the extent of criticizing their
implications, \ it is completely arbitrary to assume that the individual behaves so
as to maximize an integral of the form envisaged in (2)" (pp. 156, 159). To stress
his point even further, he concluded the article by noting, \the idea that the results
of such a statistical investigation could have any inuence upon ethical judgments of
policy is one which deserves the impatience of modern economists" (p. 161). However,
despite Samuelson's misgivings and partly for reasons discussed earlier in this paper,
economists and social scientists still persist with the model as the standard tool in
intertemporal choice analysis. In the course of time, several anomalies have been
identied and we review each sequentially citing specic studies along the way.
One of the most highlighted anomalies in the DUmodel concerns the empirical validity
of the constant rate of discount assumption. Empirical evidence suggests that discount
rates fall over time. This phenomenon also known as hyperbolic discounting contends
that the discount rate, r, is not constant from one period to the next but declining in
time.15 In one study, Thaler (1981) asked respondents to state an amount over three
distinct future time periods, that is, one month, one year and ten years that would
be equivalent to receiving $15 now. The median responses were $20 for one month,
$50 for one year and $100 for 10 years representing discount rates of 345%, 120%
and 19% respectively (Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002, 360). In another
experimental study, Slonim, Carlson & Bettinger (2007) asked subjects to choose
between receiving a given amount of money by varying front-end delays (3 levels:
0 days, 2 days and y months). In each case, subjects got more patient the greater
the front-end delay (0 < 2 < y) at the mean and 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles
implying falling discount rates over time. Other empirical studies have found patterns
consistent with declining discount rates (Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil 1989, Redelmeier
& Heller 1993, Chapman & Elstein 1995, Pender 1996).
A common nding in these studies is that there is a steep drop in the value of a reward
in the very short term which is not captured by exponential discounting. Thus, indi-
viduals are extremely impatient about payos occuring in the very near future leading
15We do not go into specics of hyperbolic discounting at this time since the topic is addressed
broadly in later sections.
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to relatively high discount rates over short horizons (Laibson 1997, p.445). On the
other hand, payos far into the future are discounted more heavily under exponential
discounting as the empirically implied rate falls below the constant discount rate. In
addition, Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue (2002) note that when mathematical
functions are explicitly t to measured data, a hyperbolic functional form or one that
imposes declining discount rates is seen to t the data better than the exponential
functional form, that is, one that imposes constant discount rates (p. 360).
A second anomaly in the DU model relates to the magnitude of payo eect. The DU
model does not make any distinction between the size or magnitude of a payo and
thus implicitly assumes that an individual's rate of discount at any point in time is
independent of this factor. However, empirical evidence suggests that individuals dis-
count larger payos at a lower rate compared to smaller amounts. Benzion, Rapoport
& Yagil (1989) examined the eect of varying the amount of money involved (4 levels:
$40, $200, $1000, $5000) and the time period (4 levels: 0.5, 1, 2, and 4 years) on the
discount rate. In all scenarios, they found that discount rates decrease as the size
of cashow increases. For example, for the two year time period, the mean discount
rates were 0.228 for $40, 0.183 for $200, 0.16 for $1000, and 0.123 for $2000.
In another experimental study, Thaler (1981) asked respondents to state an amount
that they would be willing to accept in a year's time in exchange for a given amount
today. He varied the amounts (3 levels: $15, $250 and $3000). On average, the
ndings were $60, $350 and $4000 respectively implying rates of 139%, 34% and 29%
(Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002, 363). Other empirical studies that have
found the existence of a magnitude eect include (Holcomb & Nelson 1992, Green,
Myerson & McFadden 1997, Kirby & Marakovic 1995).
A third anomaly that has been identied in the DU model relates to how individuals
discount losses vis-a-vis gains or what is sometimes known as the sign eect. The DU
model does not distinguish between positive payos and negative payos and thus
implicitly assumes that if such payos occur at the same point in time, then they
should be discounted using the same rate. Empirical evidence on the other hand
suggests that individuals are quite anxious to receive a positive reward, especially a
small one, but are less anxious to postpone a loss (Loewenstein & Thaler 1989, p.187).
Therefore, they discount gains at a higher rate in relation to losses. In one study,
Loewenstein (1988) found that on average, subjects were indierent to receiving $100
now and $157 in a year's time whereas the same subjects were indierent to losing $100
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now and $133 in a years time implying a rate of 0.45 for gains and 0.29 for losses.16
The corresponding gures for $10 were $21 for gains and $15 for losses implying rates
of 0.74 and 0.41 respectively (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992, p.575).17 In another study,
Thaler (1981) asked subjects how much they would be willing to pay for a trac
ticket given that they had the option of either paying now or delaying (3 levels: 0.25,
1, 3 years). The ndings resulted in lower discount rates being imputed in relation to
those from comparable questions relating to positive payos (Fredrick, Loewenstein
& O'Donoghue 2002, p.363). Other studies that have found similar patterns include
(Redelmeier & Heller 1993, Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil 1989, Mischel, Grusec &
Masters 1969).
A fourth anomaly in the DU model concerns the empirical validity of the stationar-
ity property of exponential discounting or what is often referred to as the common
dierence eect.18 Empirical evidence points to a preference reversal which is not
accounted for by the DU model wherein an individual may choose A over B at time
t only for the same individual to choose B over A at say t + 50 days. Strotz (1956)
highlights this anomaly when he notes that \the optimal plan (as predicted by the DU
model) of the present moment is generally one which will not be obeyed, or that the
individual's future behavior will be inconsistent with his optimal plan" (p. 165). In
one study for example, subjects preferred to receive $100 now over receiving $110 the
next day and the same subjects when asked to state their preference after a specied
time delay preferred $110 in 31 days over $100 in 30 days (Fredrick, Loewenstein &
O'Donoghue 2002, p.361).
One implication of the common dierence eect is that it results in dynamically in-
consistent behavior. Empirical evidence shows this anomaly to hold in a synchronic
sense, that is subjects are asked questions at a single point in time and show the pref-
erence reversal as evaluated from that particular point in time. Fredrick, Loewenstein
& O'Donoghue (2002) possess an `implicit belief' that preference reversals in a syn-
chronic sense lead to preference reversals in a diachronic sense. Taking the study
above as an example, the same subjects who prefer $110 in 31 days over $100 in 30
days if brought back to the laboratory in 30 days time will prefer $100 at that time
16These discount rates are not explicitly given. However, we can impute them easily in the
following way: $100 = $157  e 0:45111 = $133  e 0:28511. The general formula is of course
PV = FV  e rt and given that t = 1, it follows on that r =  ln(PVFV ).
17The studies cited were originally part of Loewenstein G.,\The Weighting of Waiting: Response
Mode Eects in Intertemporal Choice," working paper, Center for Decision Research, University of
Chicago, 1988.
18For a review of the property, refer to section 2.1.2
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over $110 one day later. They note that that this is contrary to hyperbolic discount-
ing. However, to the extent that subjects anticipate such diachronic reversals and seek
ways to avoid them such as through some commitment mechanism, the preference of
commitment in itself on their part may be interpreted as evidence for hyperbolic dis-
counting (p. 361). Other studies that have found the existence of preference reversals
in human beings as well as animals include (Ainslie & Herrnstein 1981, Green, Fristoe
& Myerson 1994, Kirby & Marakovic 1995, Green, Fischer, Perlow & Sherman 1981).
A fth anomaly in the DU model rst identied by Loewenstein (1988) relates the
apparent existence of an asymmetric preference between delaying and speeding up
consumption or what is commonly referred to as the delay-speed up asymmetry.19. In
Loewenstein's study, subjects were willing to accept two to four times the amount
of compensation for delaying a real reward by a given time interval t to t + s than
they were willing to give up in order to speed up consumption over the same interval,
that is, t + s to t (Loewenstein & Prelec 1992, p.578). In another study, subjects
who were not expecting to receive a VCR for another year were on average willing
to pay $54 to receive it immediately whereas those who were expecting to receive
it immediately on average demanded $126 to delay receipt of the VCR by a year
(Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002, 363). The ndings constitute a framing
eect that is inconsistent with the DU model. Other subsequent studies that have
found similar patterns include (Shelley 1993, Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil 1989).
Finally, a sixth anomaly in the DU model that has been documented suggests that
individuals show preference over improving sequences of outcomes. Principally, this
anomaly contradicts the DU model's positive rate of time preference assumption.20 21
In a study by Loewenstein & Sicherman (1991), a majority of respondents expressed
preference for an increasing payment sequence over a decreasing and at sequence.
In the study, it was noted that sequence took precedence over present value maxi-
mization. Thus, an increasing sequence was preferred to a decreasing sequence even
though the latter yielded a higher net present value compared to the former. On
average, respondents were willing to give up $2351 to obtain their preferred payment
19Loewenstein's study was part of \Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice," Management Sci-
ence, XXXIV (1988), 200-14
20Refer to section 2.1.1 for a review
21Fredrick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue (2002) note that positive discounting is the norm in in-
tertemporal choice studies e.g., choosing between X at  and Y at 
0
(p. 363). Thus, if 
0
>  ,
given a choice between receiving X at either period, positive discounting implies that one will always
choose X at  (X > 0).
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option in stead of the present value-maximizing declining payment option. In another
study by Varey & Kahneman (1992), it was found that subjects had preference for
streams of decreasing discomfort to increasing discomfort eventhough taken over an
interval, the overall sum of discomfort in both cases was equal (Fredrick, Loewenstein
& O'Donoghue 2002, 363). Other studies that have replicated these ndings include
(Hsee, Abelson & Salovey 1991, Loewenstein & Prelec 1993, Chapman 2000).
Having highlighted behavioral anomalies in the DU model, we now explore alternative
specications that have been suggested in part to address these anomalies. We begin
with the quasi-hyperbolic model.
2.2 The Quasi-Hyperbolic Model
The quasi-hyperbolic discount function was proposed by Phelps & Pollak (1968) in a
model of intergenerational altruism. Their model took the form:
U = u(Co) + u(C1) + 
2u(C2) + 
3u(C3) + :::; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1 (11)
where  reects time preference or \myopia" and all other variables as previously
dened under the DU model. (p.186)
2.2.1 Analysis of Phelps and Pollak's specication
An analysis of (11) reveals that it is identical to the DU model in (2) when  = 1.
To interpret the role of  in Phelps and Pollak's specication, we can rewrite (11) in
the following way:
U = u(co) + [u(c1) + 
2u(c2) + 
3u(c3) + :::]: (12)
From (12), we can interpret  as a weight factor applicable to all future periods. For
example, taking the case where  < 1, say  ' 0:33 and  ' 1, we have:
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f1; ; 2; 3; :::g = f1; 1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
; :::g
) U = u(co) + 1
3
[u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3):::] (13)
From (13), we can derive some properties of a quasi-hyperbolic function. We note
that:
 Relative to the present period, all periods in the future are worth less (weight
1
3
).
 Most of the discounting (in our case all) occurs between the present and the
immediate future.
 Between future periods, there is little (in our case no) additional discounting.
Thus, the quasi-hyperbolic model partly addresses one of the suggested behavioral
anomalies in the DU model, that is, hyperbolic discounting. By introducing the
variable , Phelps & Pollak were able to capture the extreme impatience individuals
appear to have for payos that occur in the very near future. Since as we noted above,
 2 (0; 1), it follows on that the smaller the value of , the greater is the eective
discount rate applicable to the immediate future.
! 0) ! 0) u(c1)! 0 (14)
From (14), we observe that if  is arbitrarily close to zero reecting the case of
extreme myopia, then the agent assigns a minute value to all payos that occur after
the present reecting very high discounting of the near future. The model still assumes
a positive rate of time preference since the future is still never valued more than the
present, that is,  < 1; 8 t.
Another similarity to the DU model is that the change in discounting after the rst
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period is constant and equal to  irrespective of the value assigned to :
DU model;
3
2
= : quasi  hyperbolic model : 
3
2
= : (15)
Hence, by virtue of its similarity to the DU model, the quasi-hyperbolic functional
form retains the mathematical tractability of exponential discounting at the same time
capturing many of the qualitative implications of hyperbolic discounting (Fredrick,
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002, 366)22.
However, unlike the DU model, the quasi-hyperbolic function results in an agent
having time-inconsistent preferences since , the marginal rate of substitution between
t and t+1 from the view point of any past period is replaced by  at t. To illustrate
this point, let us revert to our example above. Taking equation (13), we note that
at a given time t, the agent will prefer to be patient between the subsequent future
periods t+ 1 and t+ 2, i.e.,
Ut = u(ct) +
1
3
[uct+1 + uct+2 + uct+3 + :::] (16)
But at t + 1, the agent is no longer patient between t + 1 and t + 2 but will have a
`present biased' time preference23 implying:
Ut+1 = u(ct+1) +
1
3
[uct+2 + uct+3 + uct+4 + :::] (17)
instead of,
Ut+1 =
1
3
[uct+1 + uct+2 + uct+3 + :::]: (18)
Strotz (1956) suggests two ways that an individual can overcome this namely through
22For a review of mathematically desirable properties of exponential discounting, refer to section
2.1.2
23the term is used by O'Donoghue & Rabin (1999) to emphasize the heavy discounting of the near
future.
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pre-commitment and consistent planning (p 165).24
2.2.2 Laibson's specication
Further credit for the development and popularization of the quasi-hyperbolic func-
tional form is due to Laibson (1997). In his paper, Laibson examines the role of
illiquid assets, such as real estate, as an imperfect form of commitment emphasiz-
ing how an individual could restrict overconsumption by holding her wealth in these
assets.
He expresses the model as a set of discrete values, f1; ; 2; 3; :::g. Thus, the
discount function is such that,
D(t) =
8<:1 if t = 0 ;t if t > 0 : (19)
Based on empirical evidence, Laibson further suggests that  should be calibrated
in the interval (0; 2
3
) assuming that  is close to unity (p. 542). We plot a quasi-
hyperbolic function in Figure 2 for dierent combinations of . Additionally, we
include the theoretical limit case wherein  = 1 and  = 1 implying zero discounting.
This is represented by the dashed line in the gure.
24Here, we should mention Strotz's (1956) paper which was the rst to challenge the DU model.
In his paper, he considers an individual who chooses a plan of consumption over a future time period
that maximizes her present utility subject to a budget constraint. Given that the individual is free
to reconsider her plan at a later date, Strotz asks whether she will carry through her initial plan at
that future point in time and concludes that \the individual's future behavior will be inconsistent
with her optimal plan" (p 165). Strotz also notes that any discount rate other than exponential
would lead to time-inconsistent preferences.
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Figure 2: Quasi-hyperbolic discount function (t versus t)
(u(c1) = u(c2) = ::: = u(c1) = 1)
2.3 Hyperbolic Models
Hyperbolic models incorporate two key behavioral aspects highlighted in the literature
namely:
 extreme impatience for payos that occur in the immediate future,
 declining discount rates over time.
Chung & Herrnstein (1961) were rst to propose that results from animal behavior
experiments could be characterized by hyperbola-like functions. Their conclusions
implicit in their \matching law" were later empirically shown to apply to human
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subjects as well (Laibson 1997, 449).25
Several hyperbolic functional forms have been proposed and we review three of the
most prominent in the following sections starting with Ainslie (1975).
2.3.1 Ainslie's functional form
Ainslie (1975) suggested the following functional form:
D(t) =
1
t
(20)
where D(t) is the discount function and t is the length of the delay. Figure 3 exhibits
a plot of this function.
An analysis of the hyperbolic discount function in (20) reveals that the value of the
function falls as the time delay increases or D(t) is strictly monotone decreasing.
D0(t) =   1
t2
< 0 (21)
Taking the limit cases, we note:
lim
t!0
D(t) =1 (22)
lim
t!1
D(t) = 0 (23)
These properties thus account for two anomalies inherent in the DU model, that is,
declining discount rates over time and the common dierence eect. However, the
other anomalies such as the magnitude eect, sign eect, preference for improving
sequences and delay-speed up asymmetry are not accounted for by this specication.
25Richard Herrnstein's matching law is a quantitative relationship between relative rates of re-
sponse and relative rates of reinforcement in two (or more) simultaneously available schedules of
reinforcement. Herrnstein formulated the law following an experiment with pigeons. Formally, it
can be expressed P1=(P1+P2) = R1=(R1+R2) where P1 andP2 represent rates of responses on two
schedules yielding rates of reinforcement R1 and R2 respectively.
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Figure 3: Hyperbolic discount function D(t) = 1
t
2.3.2 Herrnstein and Mazur's functional form
Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987) proposed the following functional form:
D(t) =
1
1 + kt
(24)
where k is the discount rate and the other variables as previously dened.
Unlike Ainslie's (1975) specication wherein the discount rate is not explicit, the
above functional form sets out a clear relationship between the discount function and
the discount rate. Analytically, this is easily established below:
d
dk
 1
1 + kt

=   t
(1 + kt)2
< 0; t > 0; k > 0 (25)
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and similarly, with respect to a marginal time delay,
d
dt
 1
1 + kt

=   k
(1 + kt)2
< 0; t > 0; k > 0 (26)
It is evident from (25) and (26) that the specication implies an inverse relationship
between the the discount function and both k and t thus accounting for the declining
discount rates anomaly.
2.3.3 Loewenstein and Prelec's functional form
Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) suggested the following hyperbolic functional form:
D(t) =
1
(1 + t)=
;  > 0 (27)
where  is the extent to which the function deviates from exponential discounting
and  is a time preference parameter and the other variables as previously dened.
Given the constraints placed on  and , that is, positive rate of time preference and a
positive departure from exponential discounting, we still note an inverse relationship
between the discount function and a time delay, t.
d
dt
 1
(1 + t)=

=  (1 + t)1   < 0 (28)
since  > 0; (1 + t)1 

 > 0:
Streich & Levy (2007, p.209) note that this specication by Loewenstein & Prelec
probably provides the best t with experimental data but acknowledge its complex
formulation citing that students of intertemporal choice prefer to use Herrnstein and
Mazur's functional form.
2.3.4 Concluding Remarks
A limitation of hyperbolic discount functions including in all three specications above
is their non-convergence property as it relates to summing an innite series of payos.
Thus, economists and social scientists alike face great diculty when trying to use
these functions due to their non-tractability and more often than not choose the
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exponential form even though it appears not to be empirically valid. This property
will be highlighted later in our analysis. Additionally, out of the six main DU model
anomalies discussed in Section 2.1.3, only two are accounted for by the hyperbolic
functional forms in Section 2.3. These are the declining discount rates anomaly and
the common dierence eect. The quasi-hyperbolic specication by Phelps & Pollak
(1968) and Laibson (1997) only partly accounts for these two anomalies.
Nonetheless, even though hyperbolic models fail to account for a majority of the
DU model's behavioral anomalies, there is still huge interest among researchers on
the topic. A search on Science Direct, one of the world's largest online collections
of published scientic research (key word: hyperbolic discounting) shows an over
800% increase in the number of published articles in the past decade alone indicating
that developments in the subject area are still a work in progress. Figure 10 in the
Appendix - Section 6.3 C1 shows the trend over the past century.
The challenge for economists and social scientists thus is to develop a discount func-
tion which adequately addresses each of the behavioral anomalies in the DU model.
This is complicated by the fact that a number of the anomalies are psychological in
nature. Table 1 relates each of the suggested non-exponential models of discount-
ing and the DU model anomalies. We now consider an IPD model and examine the
implications of changing the discount rate from the standard exponential form.
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Table 1: Non-exponential models of discounting and DU model anomalies
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3 An IPD Model under non-exponential discount-
ing
3.1 Model description
We model the interaction between 2 rms in the form of an innite IPD. Both rms
produce a homogeneous non-durable and non-storable good which lasts for one period
only. Demand for the good is of nite magnitude and both rms are aware of the
aggregate industry demand curve. For simplicity, we assume the non-existence of
production costs implying that each rm can satisfy the industry demand on its own.
No alternative producers for the good exist and there are no substitutes. Hence,
demand for the good is inelastic. We further assume that the rm's decision variable
is the price and disregard quantity for purposes of this analysis. Each rm is owned
by an independent entity whose key objective is to maximize the net present value of
an innite stream of future payos. The payos of one rm not only depend on the
price it charges for the good but also the price charged by the other rm. Thus, the
rm can choose between two actions namely cooperate or defect. We give a precise
denition of these terms:
Denition D   1: Cooperate - rm i, i 2 f1; 2g is said to cooperate if it sells the
good at time t for a given price which was pre-agreed at time t  1 by both, itself and
the other rm.
Denition D  2: Defect - rm i is said to defect if it sells the good at time t for a
lower price than that which was pre-agreed at time t  1 by both, itself and the other
rm.
We assume that consumers of this good and the rms are instrumentally rational
(IR). This means that the consumers, for example, will buy the good from the rm
charging a lower price and shun the rm charging a higher price. We represent this
information in the form of a normal form game using standard notation below:
1. The set of players (rms) is given by
I  f1; 2g:
2. The actions available to rm i; i 2 I denoted ai1 and ai2:
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ai1 = cooperate, a
i
2 =defect.
3. Firm i's action set is denoted by Ai : Ai = fai1; ai2g.
4. The outcome of the game, denoted a; there are four possible outcomes:
a1 = fcooperate; cooperateg,
a2 = fcooperate; defectg,
a3 = fdefect; cooperateg,
a4 = fdefect; defectg.
Thus, having established preliminary notation for the model, we now introduce a
notation for the payos of rm i under each possible outcome. We consider the rst
outcome wherein both rms cooperate. In this case, both rms will sell a specic
quantity of the good at a pre-agreed price earning a cooperative prot which we
denote C. In the case where rm i cooperates and the other rm defects, consumers
will shun rm i and buy the good from the other rm charging a lower price. In
this case, rm i nets a zero prot denoted Z and the other rm earns an abnormal
prot denoted A. Finally, in the case where both rms defect, then both earn a
subnormal prot which we denote S.26 The following inequality holds with respect
to the magnitudes of these payos:
A > C > S > Z27.
Using standard notation, we represent the payos for rm 1 under the four possible
outcomes previously listed:
1(a1) = C,
1(a2) = Z,
1(a3) = A,
1(a4) = S.
26For purposes of this model, we assume that deviation is to a specic price below that which was
agreed by both rms. This means that if both rms deviate, they still end up charging the same
price and not some other arbitrary lower price which may dier.
27Given this payo structure, if we replace cooperate with confess and defect with not confess we
obtain the famous Prisoners' Dilemma game originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher
working at RAND in 1950 and later formalized by Albert W. Tucker.
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Similarly, for rm 2 we have:
2(a1) = C,
2(a2) = A,
2(a3) = Z,
2(a4) = S.
We represent the normal form game in matrix form below:
Firm 2
Firm 1
cooperate defect
cooperate C C Z A
defect A Z S S
Table 2: 2-Firm PD game
The matrix above contains all the data necessary to dene our 2-rm PD game. We
suppose that the two rms interact an innite number of times (i.e., T =1). Thus,
as our 2 rms go to the market at the start of each period, they are confronted with
the situation as is represented in Table 2 and this is repeated an innite number of
times.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the innitely IPD model under dierent forms
of discount functions, we rst limit our analysis to one kind of strategy called trigger
strategies. We use Shy's (1995) denition and adapt it to our model. Hence, in this
class of trigger strategies, rm i cooperates in period t (playing ai = cooperate) as
long as it and the other rm cooperated in period    1. However, if either rm i or
the other rm played defect in period    1, then rm i \pulls the trigger" and plays
defect forever or, ai = defect for every t = ;  + 1;  + 2; :::. Formally,
Denition D   3 : Firm i is said to be playing a trigger strategy if for every
period;  = 1; 2; :::;
ai =
8<:cooperate as long as ai = aj = cooperate 8 t = 1; :::;    1defect otherwise :
In other words, rm i plays cooperate as long as both, itself and the other rm, have
not deviated from this outcome. However, in the event that a rm deviates even once,
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rm i punishes the deviator by playing defect forever.
3.2 Analysis of equilibrium conditions in the 2-Firm IPD
Model.
We now analyze the IPD model under three distinct discount functions namely expo-
nential, quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting. Specically, we seek to establish
conditions under which cooperation emerges as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
under each of these specications. It is worth noting that in a one shot PD game,
discounting plays no role and the outcome where each rm defects and charges a
lower price for the good is a unique Nash equilibrium. By extension, if the game is
repeated a nite number of times and the players are aware of this fact, then dis-
counting plays no role either and the non-cooperative outcome still remains a unique
SPE. One proof of this involves using backward induction (see Shy (1995, p.30) and
Appendix - Section 6.2 B1).
The discount factor enters the frame if the IPD is played an innite number of times.
The main reason for such an analysis is the fact that under certain circumstances,
outcomes which are not SPE's under a one shot game (namely cooperate) can emerge
if the game is repeated an innite number of times or if there is uncertainty with
regards to the number of repetitions. Our analysis thus seeks to investigate specic
conditions under which cooperation emerges but unlike most such analysis which
implicitly use constant-rate discounting, we introduce two more specications which
appear to have some empirical basis as has been outlined in the literature. Thus, in
our analysis the exponential case acts as the base.
Proposition 1. Under exponential discounting, the outcome where both
players play their trigger strategy is SPE if   A - CA - S .
Proof. We rst consider the case where rm 1 cooperates in all periods. In this
scenario, it will earn a payo of C in each period since 1(a1) = C.
PV of innite cooperation:
C + C + 2C + 3C + ::: = C
 1
1  

(29)
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since
1 + + 2 + 3 + ::: =
1X
t=0
t =
1
1  :
We consider the second possible case where rm 1 defects in one period. Under the
trigger strategy dened in D  3; rm 2 would deviate in all subsequent periods and
play defect. Firm 1's payo would thus be A in the initial period and S in each
period thereafter since 1(a3) = A and 1(a4) = S.
PV of deviation under trigger strategy:
A+ S + 2S + 3S + ::: = A+ S
 1
1  

  S =)
= S
A
S
+
1
1     1

: (30)
Comparing (29) and (30) yields the conclusion that deviation is not benecial for rm
1 if:
  A  C
A  S : (31)
Proof: See Appendix - section 6.2 B2
Therefore, given the existence of exponential rms in our model, the discount factor
must satisfy (31) for cooperation to emerge as an SPE. If the discount factor is below
this level, both rms will nd it benecial to defect at all periods.
Proposition 2. Under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, trigger strategies con-
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stitute an SPE if   A - C(C - S) + A - C .
Proof. We use Phelps & Pollak (1968) specication of a quasi-hyperbolic discount
function to analyze the model.28 Taking the case where rm 1 cooperates in all
periods, we have:
C + C + 2C + 3C + ::: =)
= C
 1

+
1
1     1

(32)
since
 + + 2 + 3 + ::: = 
1X
t=0
t = 
 1
1  

:
If rm 1 defects in one period, we again note that under the trigger strategy dened
in D   3; rm 2 would deviate and play defect indenitely or in other words \pull
the trigger" and not cooperate forever. In this case, we have:
A+ S + 2S + 3S + ::: =)
= A+ S
 1
1     1

: (33)
Comparing (32) and (33) yields the conclusion that deviation is not benecial for rm
1 if:
  A  C
(C   S) + A  C  
() (34)
Proof: See Appendix - Section 6.2 B3
28For details on the specication, refer to Chapter 2, section 2.2
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Dierentiating (34) with respect to , we note:
d
d
() < 0
d2
d2
() > 0 (35)
Proof: See Appendix - Section 6.2 B4 & B5
Here, we observe that  is decreasing in . We plot () versus  in Figure 4.
Figure 4: () versus 
Taking the limits:
if  ! 1;  ! A  C
A  S and if ! 0; 
 ! 1 (36)
with
A  C
A  S < 1
Proof: See Appendix - Section 6.2 B6
From (36), we see that the discount factor under quasi-hyperbolic discounting neces-
sary to sustain cooperation as an SPE equals that of exponential discounting if  is
equal to 1. However, if  < 1, we require a higher  for cooperation to emerge. The
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implication therefore is that if preferences of the rms in our model are similar to
what empirical evidence suggests, then the discount factor needs to be higher than
that which exponential discounting implies for cooperation to emerge.
Proposition 3. Under hyperbolic discounting, there does not exist a level
of  for which trigger strategies constitute SPE.
Proof. Taking the case where rm 1 cooperates in all periods, under hyperbolic
discounting, we have:
C + 1C + 21
2C + 321
3C + :::+ nn 1n 2:::21nC + ::: (37)
n > n 1 > n 2 > ::: (n 2 N):
Under the second strategy where rm 1 deviates in one period, rm 2 punishes rm 1
by playing defect in all subsequent periods as a result of the trigger strategy yielding:
A+ 1S + 21
2S + 321
3S + :::+ nn 1n 2:::21nS + ::: (38)
Comparing (37) and (38), it is apparent that the series diverges and we are not able
to specify a level for  at which deviation is not benecial.29 Thus, we note that
an analytical solution is not possible due to innitely declining discount rates. This
property as was noted earlier in Section 2.3.4 is a limitation of a purely hyperbolic
discount function as it relates to the analysis of an innite series of payos.
29In our specication of a hyperbolic function, we drop the constraint i 2 (0; 1) imposed under
quasi-hyperbolic discounting to account for falling discount rates into the future.
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4 Applications to wage theory: Eciency wages
Eciency wages act as a mechanism to deter cheating among employees. Cheating
may take various forms including ocers of a police department accepting bribes, a
captain of an oil tanker getting intoxicated while on the job, analysts in an investment
bank recommending investment options without exercising diligence, salespeople in a
marketing division entertaining family and friends instead of customers, etc. (Milgrom
& Roberts 1981, 250).
4.1 The Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model
Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) eciency wage model forms a basis in which an organization
can determine at what level it will be benecial to set an employee's wage in order to
deter cheating. In their model, a worker who does not cheat or \shirk" is dened as
one who performs at the customary eort level. She will receive a wage denoted w and
will retain her job until exogenous factors result in separation. On the other hand, an
employee who shirks and gets caught will lose her job and will receive unemployment
benets denoted w with eort e being equal to zero (e = 0). There is a q probability
that the employee will be caught if she shirks. The probability that a worker will be
separated from her job through some external factors such as relocation is denoted b
and is assumed to be exogenous. Thus, the model states that the employee will opt
not to shirk if the expected lifetime utility of an employed non-shirker denoted (V NE )
is greater or equal to the expected lifetime utility of an employed shirker denoted
(V SE ). In formal terms:
rV SE = w + (b+ q)(Vu   V SE ) (39)
rV NE = w   e+ b(Vu   V SN ) (40)
Where Vu is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed individual and r is the
employee's pure rate of time preference. Thus, in terms of the lifetime utilities, (39)
and (40) are rearranged to get:
V SE =
w + (b+ q)Vu
r + b+ q
(41)
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V NE =
(w   e) + bVu
r + b
(42)
and the non-shirking condition (NSC) being:
V NE  V SE (43)
Finally, in terms of the wage rate, they conclude that:
w  rVu + (r + b+ q)e
q
 w^ (44)
where w^ is the eciency wage.
Thus, the model states that the eciency wage rate is a function of the interest rate,
that is, the higher the interest rate, the greater should be the eciency wage.
4.2 Shapiro-Stiglitz model under non-exponential discount-
ing
One implication as it relates to the discount function is that a rm which unknowingly
or otherwise believes that its employees are exponential discounters (when in fact they
are quasi-hyperbolic or hyperbolic discounters) would consistently set the wage rate
at a lower level than that which is required to eectively deter shirking. To illustrate
this, let us assume that a rm is able to divide an employee's work contract into 4
distinct time periods which we denote  1;  2;  3 and  4, where  1 is the rst period of
the contract,  2 is the second period and so on. If we take the average duration of an
employment contract to be 20 years, then each period lasts for 5 years representing the
very near future, the near future, the far future and the very far future. We further
assume that all other variables except the interest rate are constant in every period
and under each specication. In terms of the real wage, (44) implies that the eciency
wage will be constant over time given that the interest rate is also constant. Thus, an
identifying feature of a real eciency wage set under assumption of an exponential
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discount function is that it is constant over time according to the linear equation.30
On the other hand, in the quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic cases, since there is heavy
discounting of the very near future, in our case, period  1, we argue that in order to
be eective, the real wage rate during this period should be signicantly higher than
that set under assumption of an exponential discount function. Our argument is by
way of illustration and we make a few assumptions.
Restating the 3 discount functions:
Exponential : 1 + + 2 + 3 + :::
Quasi  hyperbolic : 1 + + 2 + 3 + :::
Hyperbolic : 1 + 1+ 21
2 + 321
3 + ::: (n > n 1 > n 2)
We note that as we move from the present to the rst period, the change in discounting
is equal to  under exponential discounting,  under quasi-hyperbolic discounting
and 1 under hyperbolic discounting.
31 We rst assume that the rm under the
belief that employees are exponential discounters determines the employees' pure rate
of time preference or r to be 0.1 and goes ahead to set the eciency wage based on
this estimate. This implies that  is equal to approximately 0.91 under assumption of
perfect capital markets. Recall that from (3), we established the following relationship
between the discount rate and the discount factor:
 =
1
1 + r
) 0:91 = 1
1 + 0:1
(45)
Thus, the exponential rm having estimated that employees possess a pure rate of
time preference of 0.1 will apply a discount factor of 0.91 to each of the 4 periods,
30Here, we stress `real' so as to ignore the eect of external factors that aect the nominal wage
rate principally among them, ination.
31It is an elementary process to obtain these results: Since at present and under each discount
function we have a value of 1, we look at the rate at which next period's payos are discounted and
divide through to obtain the change: exponential: 1 = ; quasi-hyperbolic:

1 = ; hyperbolic:
1
1 = 1.
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 1;  2;  3;  4. In the case of the quasi-hyperbolic rm, it will have to estimate a level of
 which accounts for the extreme impatience employees possess for payos that occur
in the very near future, in our case, that being  1. As noted earlier in the Section
2.2 under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, based on statistical tests by econometricians,
Laibson (1997) suggests that  lies in the interval (0; 2
3
). Thus, in our case, we assume
that the quasi-hyperbolic rm estimates the value of  to be 0.6 and goes ahead to
set an eciency wage based on this estimate. Having previously established a value
for , we have:
 = 0:6  0:91 = 0:55 : (46)
What we immediately notice is that there is a huge dierence between the two factors
applicable to period  1. The exponential rm will set it's eciency wage based on
a factor of 0.91 whereas the quasi-hyperbolic rm will apply a factor of 0.55. The
eective discount rate implied by a factor of 0.55 can be backed out from the general
formula32
r =
1

  1) r = 1
0:55
  1 = 0:82 : (47)
Thus, taking the two values for r, that is, 0.1 and 0.82 for the exponential rm and
quasi-hyperbolic rm respectively, it is clearly evident from these gures that the
quasi-hyperbolic rm's discount rate applicable at  1 is signicantly higher than that
of an exponential rm. Similarly, in the case of a hyperbolic rm, r would still be
far greater than 0.1 to account for the steep discounting of the very near future. In
terms of the eciency wage that has to be set under the Shapiro & Stiglitz shirking
model, we have to examine equation (44) to interpret the impact of having dierent
values for r.33
32Here, we are not suggesting that  is equal to 0.55 since this is the value of . What we are
trying to establish is the `eective' discount rate given the additional eect of .
33In terms of how we interpret the dierences in the discount rates obtained above, we have to
make an assumption regarding a specic wage that at time 0 generates sucient utility to deter an
agent from shirking. If we randomly assign a value of $10; 000 to represent this amount, then we
note that at 1, the real wage that the exponential rm has to pay to deter cheating is $11; 000
whereas the quasi-hyperbolic rm will have to pay a real wage of $18; 200 to achieve the same
purpose. We discount in the usual way to obtain these values: $10; 000 = $11; 000=(1 + 0:1) and
$10; 000 = $18; 200=(1 + 0:82):
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Proposition 4. At  1; rh  rqh > re ) w^h  w^qh > w^e.
Proof. If we denote the quasi-hyperbolic discount rate as rqh, the exponential discount
rate as re and the hyperbolic discount rate as rh, comparing the eciency wages at
 1 across all 3 cases, we have:
reVu + (re + b+ q)
e
q
 w^e (48)
rqhVu + (rqh + b+ q)
e
q
 w^qh (49)
rhVu + (rh + b+ q)
e
q
 w^h (50)
Since 1   <  ) rh  rqh > re at  1. From (48), (49) and (50) we conclude:
w^h  w^qh > w^e: (51)
Proposition 5. At  2; rh > rqh = re ) w^h > w^qh = w^e.
Proof. At  2, payos are discounted at the same factor under both exponential and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, that is, . In the hyperbolic case, the discount factor is
2 and the wage applicable to this period is dependent on the rm's estimate of 2.
quasi  hyperbolic : 
2

= ; hyperbolic :
21
2
1
= 2
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Since 2 < ) rh > rqh = re: From (48), (49) and (50), the following holds:
w^h > w^qh = w^e (52)
Proposition 6. At  3 and  4; rh < rqh = re ) w^h < w^qh = w^e.
Proof. The change in discounting in the hyperbolic case from the second to the third
and from the third to the fourth periods is equal to 3 and 4 respectively. In our
specication of a hyperbolic function in Section 3.2, we established the following:
n > n 1 > n 2, rn < rn 1 < rn 2
Since 3 >  and 4 >  ) rh < rqh = re at  3 and  4 respectively. From (48),
(49) and (50), we conclude:
w^h < w^qh = w^e (53)
To account for falling discount rates over time, the Shapiro & Stiglitz real wage must
fall to below the exponential level at  3 and  4 under the presence of purely hyperbolic
discounting employees. Analytically, this is made possible by allowing successive s
to be set at a level above 1. Table 3 shows the real wage prole across all 3 discount
functions during the employment contract. The implication is that wages set under
the assumption of exponential discounting may not eectively deter shirking in the
presence of hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting employees.
Time
period
Shapiro-Stiglitz real wage
 1 w^e < w^qh  w^h
 2 w^e = w^qh < w^h
 3 w^e = w^qh > w^h
 4 w^e = w^qh > w^h
(w^e - exponential wage, w^qh - quasi-hyperbolic wage, w^h - hyperbolic wage)
Table 3: Real wage comparison under exponential and non-exponential discounting.
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4.3 Equilibrium Unemployment under non-exponential dis-
counting
We consider the model of a rm due to Solow (1956) presented in (Blanchard &
Fischer 1989, p 455). The rm's production function is given by
Y = sF (e(w)L); (54)
where s reects shifts in either technology or the relative price of the rm, L is the
number of workers and the other variables as dened previously. We assume that the
eort and production functions satisfy
e(w) = 0 for w = R > 0; e0() > 0; e00() < 0 (55)
F 0() > 0 and F 00() < 0: (56)
The rm thus maximizes prot, sF (e(w)L) wL, over w and L yielding the following
rst-order conditions:
e0(w)w
e(w)
= 1; (57)
e(w)sF 0(e(w)L) = w: (58)
Under the assumptions above, it follows that wage is independent of s and only
determined by (57) which states that the elasticity of eort with respect to wage is
equal to one. Therefore (58) gives the level of employment and the equation states
that this must be such that the marginal product of an extra worker is equal to the
wage.
Reverting back to the Shapiro & Stiglitz shirking model, we introduce an additional
variable and assess equilibrium unemployment under exponential and non exponential
discounting. Thus, we assume that if a worker is unemployed, the probability of her
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becoming employed in the next period is a or she remains unemployed with probability
1  a. Given
Vu =
1
r
 a
a+ b+ r

(w   e) (59)
We can insert equation (59) into (44) and get
wi =
 a
a+ b+ r

(w   e) +
h
1 +
r + b
q
i
e (60)
where wi is the wage chosen by the rm and w is the aggregate wage. The rm thus
chooses employment such that
sF 0(Li) = wi: (61)
4.3.1 General Equilibrium in the exponential case
Assuming perfect information on job options and the existence of homogeneous rms,
the rm's wage is equal to the aggregate wage i.e.,
wi = w; 8i: (62)
Inserting w for wi in equation (60), we have
w = e+
e(a+ b+ r)
q
: (63)
We note that for our segmented employment contract, the exponential discount rate
re is constant over all 4 periods, 
1;  2;  3;  4 implying that the exponential real wage
w^e is also constant. In the steady state, the accession rate must be such that the ow
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into unemployment equals the ow out of unemployment or
bL = a(N   L)) a = bL
(N   L) (64)
Thus, taking this condition and putting it into (63) yields the equilibrium wage given
the NSC.
e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rg
q
(65)
In the exponential case, r = re 8 . The aggregate employment is given by the
condition:
sF 0
 L
M

= w; (66)
where M is the number of rms. We can thus plot an aggregate labor demand curve
for a given level of s and the NSC that would prevail in the exponential case at
all periods,  1;  2;  3;  4 (see Fig. 5). The equilibrium is given by E. Given that
the rm rightly believes that employees are exponential discounters and sets wages
at the level w, then the eciency wage will serve its purpose. From the rm's
point of view, it is uneconomical to pay a wage above w since the optimal amount
of labor is obtained at this point. On the other hand, paying a lower wage would
induce employees to shirk. Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) call the form of unemployment
that would prevail in the labor market given that all rms pay the eciency wage
as \involuntary unemployment". This is contrasted to search unemployment which
results from the lack of information on the part of job seekers and which the model
accounts for under the assumption of perfect information on job availability. Thus,
involuntary unemployment is a necessary condition for an equilibrium since the lack
of it implies no cost to losing one's job. In such an instance, an employee would shirk,
lose his job and immediately nd a new one without any consequence.
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Figure 5: Exponential case: Equilibrium unemployment under eciency wages
(NSC - No Shirking Constraint)
4.3.2 General Equilibrium in the non-exponential case
In order to analyze unemployment equilibrium in the Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) shirk-
ing model under non exponential discounting, we have to segment the employment
contract into distinct periods to account for the non-stationarity property of the
functions under consideration. Thus, we use the same segmentation previously es-
tablished. Additionally, we assume that all rms have a homogeneous employment
contract of equal duration and employment is initiated at  = 0 with no further ex-
pansion of employment possibilities throughout the duration of the contracts. Thus,
any new employment opportunity would thus arise from an employee being dismissed
as a result of shirking or some other exogenous event unique to an individual em-
ployee. In our analysis, we compare our ndings in each case with the baseline case
of exponential discounting.
At  1, that is, the rst period of the contract, both discount rates under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (rqh) and hyperbolic discounting (rh) exceed the constant ex-
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ponential discount rate (re). This is reected by the initial steep fall in both discount
functions implying extreme impatience for payos in the very near future. Therefore,
from (65), it follows on that
e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rqhg
q
> e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ reg
q
and; (67)
e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rhg
q
> e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ reg
q
(68)
Since the aggregate employment is not a function of r, the rm will still aim to
maximize its prots by increasing employment until the marginal product of labor
(MPL) is equal to the wage. Thus, the condition in (66) still prevails.
Proposition 7. At  1; the equilibrium under hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting is at E
0
implying a higher eciency wage and a higher un-
employment level.
Proof. The result is simple: From the NSC in (67) and (68), we establish that a
higher r will lead to a situation of higher wages and more unemployment. Comparing
to the exponential case in Figure 5, we note that a rm that sets its wages under the
impression that employees are quasi-hyperbolic or hyperbolic discounters would have
to set the eciency wage at a higher level i.e., w
0
compared to w in the exponential
case at  1.
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Figure 6: Non-exponential case: Equilibrium unemployment under eciency wages
Analytically, given (63), we establish a positive relationship between r and w:
d
dr

e+
e(a+ b+ r)
q

=
e
q
> 0: (69)
Hence, an increase in r occasions a north-western shift in the NSC curve. There is
no shift in the aggregate labor demand curve and thus the equilibrium under non-
exponential discounting at  1 is at E
0
translating into a higher eciency wage and
more unemployment in relation to the exponential case.
Proposition 8. At  2; in the presence of a commitment technology, the
equilibrium under quasi-hyperbolic discounting reverts the exponential
level E and remains at this level for the remainder of the contractual
period.
Proof. At  2, the quasi-hyperbolic discount rate falls back to the constant exponential
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discount rate level.34 This implies that as seen from today, the real eciency wage
in the quasi-hyperbolic case should drop to the exponential wage level at  2. Strictly
speaking, it is possible to implement a wage scheme which falls after a certain period.
However, from the perspective of the rm, such a drop in the wage rate in the pres-
ence of quasi-hyperbolic employees results in a real possibility of shirking once the
initial period ends. The dynamic inconsistency inherent in non-exponential discount
functions thus pose a problem to the company when setting an eective eciency
wage in the periods following the initial. As a result, we note that the company needs
a commitment technology at the initiation of the contract which would limit the op-
tions available to an employee in the future. One example would be the company
undertaking a specic investment which imparts the employee with skills that are of
little or no use outside the rm.35 The specic assets acquired will bind the employee
to the company even with falling real wages until such time some exogenous event
results in separation or retirement. We therefore conclude that under the existence
of quasi-hyperbolic employees and in the presence of a commitment technology, the
equilibrium at  2 reverts to E from E
0
and remains at this level for each of the sub-
sequent contractual periods,  3;  4 (see Fig. 7). Thus, as we move from  1 to  2, the
fall in r results in a lower wage and less unemployment since there is a south-eastern
shift in the NSC curve.
34We earlier established that the change in discounting in both the exponential and the quasi-
hyperbolic cases in consecutive periods after the rst to be . Thus, after the rst period, r is also
equal in both cases.
35Instances of rms undertaking specic human capital investments are not rare. As an example, a
company may choose to train its sta on using Microsoft Dynamics NAV software for its enterprize
resource planning (ERP) needs knowing that its competitor uses a dierent software e.g. SAP
Business One. Thus, an employee who considers joining the competitor has a disincentive since she
needs to invest in learning the new software.
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Figure 7: Quasi-hyperbolic case in the presence of a commitment technology
( 2;  3;  4): Equilibrium unemployment under eciency wages
Proposition 9. At  2; in the presence of a commitment technology, the
equilibrium under hyperbolic discounting shifts to ET leading to a higher
eciency wage and a higher level of unemployment.
Proof. In the pure hyperbolic case, the rm will have to incorporate falling discount
rates over the duration of the contract. At  2 and in each of the subsequent periods,
the rm has to estimate the rate at which the discount rate falls and in the process the
corresponding wage at each period. The wage scheme still requires an accompanying
commitment technology to be eective. Assuming that the rate of decline in the
discount rate is not steep, at  2, we have:
e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rhg
q
> e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ reg
q
= e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rqhg
q
(70)
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implying
wh > we = wqh: (71)
Graphically, as we move from  1 to  2, there is a south-eastern shift in the NSC curve
but the new equilibrium is at a wage rate higher than in the exponential case. We
denote this equilibrium ET (see Fig. 8). Here, wages have declined and there is less
unemployment but still more of the labor force is unemployed in comparison to the
exponential case (LT > L).
Figure 8: Hyperbolic case in the presence of a commitment technology
( 2; wh > we = wqh): Equilibrium unemployment under eciency wages
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Proposition 10. At  3 and  4; in the presence of a commitment tech-
nology, the equilibrium under hyperbolic discounting shifts to E3 and E4
respectively leading to a lower eciency wage and less unemployment.
Proof. At  3; r drops to below the constant exponential discount rate and drops even
further at  4, the nal period of the contract. Thus, we have:
e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rhg
q
< e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ reg
q
= e+
ef[bL=(N   L)] + b+ rqhg
q
(72)
implying
wh < we = wqh: (73)
Thus, in both periods  3 and  4, we have a south-eastern shift in the NSC. The
equilibrium wage falls to E3 and E4 respectively leading to a further fall in unem-
ployment (see Fig. 9). Thus, under the existence of pure hyperbolic employees and
in the presence of a commitment technology, we conclude that the Shapiro & Stiglitz
shirking model is characterized by falling real wages over the course of the employment
contract.
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Figure 9: Hyperbolic case in the presence of a commitment technology
( 3;  4; wh < we = wqh): Equilibrium unemployment under eciency wages
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5 Summary and Conclusion
The growing interest on alternative models of discounting particularly over the last
decade points to an awareness among economists and other social scientists on the
limitations of Samuelson's (1937) DU model. Despite its lack of empirical validity,
the model which leads to an exponential function still remains the dominant model
in intertemporal choice analysis. In this paper, we began by revising literature on
the motives for discounting. We identied four main motives including pure time
discounting, uncertainty and risk, opportunity cost and diminishing marginal utility.
We then reviewed assumptions inherent in the DU model including constant discount
rate, positive rate of time preference, utility independence, consumption indepen-
dence, stationary instantaneous utility and independence of discounting from con-
sumption. We examined desirable properties of exponential discounting which may
in part explain the prominence of the DU model and these include its stationarity
property implying dynamic consistency and its mathematical tractability. Following
a review of the literature, we highlighted the major behavioral anomalies in the DU
model including declining discount rates, magnitude eect, sign eect, common dif-
ference eect, delay-speed up asymmetry and preference over improving sequences
of outcomes. In particular, we noted that declining discount rates and the common
dierence eect contradict the constant discount rate assumption which is the core
assumption of the DU model.
We examined alternatives to the DU model that have been suggested in part to
account for these anomalies, rst among them the quasi hyperbolic model by Phelps
& Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997). We noted that the model partly accounts for
the declining discount rates and the common dierence eect anomalies. In addition,
its similarity to the DU model after the rst period implies that it maintains the
mathematical tractability of exponential discounting. However, the model falls short
of being descriptively accurate since it does not fully account for declining rates into
the future and other DU model anomalies. Further, we looked at hyperbolic models
that incorporate declining discount rates with the progression of time and identied
three functional forms, that is, Ainslie (1975), Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987),
and Loewenstein & Prelec (1992). We noted that although these models appear
to be descriptively better than both the exponential and quasi-hyperbolic forms,
their limitation lies in their lack of convergence thus restricting their application in
intertemporal choice analysis.
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In the analysis section, we modeled the interaction between two rms in the form
of an innite IPD and analyzed the equilibrium conditions under non exponential
discounting necessary to sustain cooperation as an SPE. We found that under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, we require a higher discount factor to induce the cooperative
outcome. We analyzed the Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) Shirking model under non ex-
ponential discounting and concluded that wages set under the assumption of expo-
nential discounting may not eectively deter shirking in the presence of hyperbolic
or quasi-hyperbolic discounting employees. Finally, we concluded our analysis by
examining unemployment equilibrium in the model incorporating Solow (1956). We
found that initially under both quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting, we have
higher wages and more unemployment compared to the exponential case. After the
initial period, unemployment and wages in the quasi-hyperbolic case revert to the
exponential level but in the hyperbolic case, the Shapiro & Stiglitz shirking model is
characterized by falling real wages over the course of the employment contract.
Thus our analysis reveals that divergences from what economic modeling predicts
and what is empirically observed can in part be attributed to the discount function
employed by the modeler, if in fact what the literature suggests is true. In most
cases, this fact is often overlooked and if policies are formulated based on economic
models that do not account for this apparent inaccuracy, then they run the risk of
not achieving their desired results. In the extreme case, they may lead to potentially
harmful eects on welfare. Therefore, at the very least, modelers of social and eco-
nomic behavior should seriously consider the eect of the discount function employed.
The critical evaluation of the assumptions a model is resting on should clearly extend
to the aspect of discounting behavior. On the research part, we believe that any
further work geared towards developing descriptively adequate models of discounting
is a positive contribution to the entire scope of the social sciences and the area of
intertemporal choice in particular.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A
A1: Given the innite series in (10), we prove that the series converges to 1
1  below:
1 + + 2 + 3 + ::: =
1X
n=0
n =
1
1  
We rst determine the nth term in the series. Given the beginning of the series
and using the notation s1; s2; :::; sn to indicate the 1st, 2nd, ..., nth partial sums
respectively, we have:
s1 = 1
s2 = 1 + 
sn = 1 + + 
2 + :::+ n 1 (6.74)
Having determined the nth partial sum, i.e., sn we multiply it by  and get:
sn = + 
2 + 3 + :::+ n (6.75)
Subtracting (6:75) from (6:74) we have:
sn   sn = 1  n:
From the above, we can easily solve for sn:
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sn(1  ) = 1  n:
sn =
(1  n)
1   ; ( 6= 1):
If j  j< 1; then n ! 0 as n ! 1 and sn ! 11  . If j  j> 1; then j n j! 1 and
the series diverges.
However, we know from the DU model that due to the positive rate of time preference
assumption, we never have j  j> 1. We thus note that (10) converges to 1
1  .
//
A2: Given the following specication of the DU model in (5)
U(c1; c2; :::; cN) = u(c1) +
u(c2)
1 + r
+ :::+
u(cN)
(1 + r)N 1
:
We show that the discount factor is constant from one period to the next by selecting
a representative period m, m 2 Z+.
At period m, the cardinal instantaneous utility function, u(cm) is discounted at factor:
1
(1 + r)m 1
:
In the next period, i.e., m+ 1; u(cm+1) is discounted at factor:
1
(1 + r)m
:
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The change in discounting over the two periods is given by:
( 1
1+r
)m
( 1
1+r
)m 1
(6.76)
Solving (6.76) we get:
= (
1
1 + r
)m  (1 + r)m 1 = (1 + r)
m 1
(1 + r)m
= (1 + r)m 1 m
= (1 + r) 1 =
1
1 + r
= 
//
6.2 Appendix B
B1: Given the IPD model in Section 3, we prove that the game has a unique SPE if
played a nite number of times which we denote T; (1  T < 1), where each rm
plays defect in each period :
The proof involves backward induction. First, we determine the NE of the game using
rm i's best response function (i = f1; 2g); i 6= j:
Taking the payos for both player i and for player j under each outcome:
i(a1) = C j(a1) = C,
i(a2) = Z j(a2) = A,
i(a3) = A j(a3) = Z,
i(a4) = S j(a4) = S.
Where,
a1 = fcooperate; cooperateg;
a2 = fcooperate; defectg;
a3 = fdefect; cooperateg;
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a4 = fdefect; defectg.
and given A > C > S > Z, we note player i's best response mapping is:
Ri(aj) =
8<:defect if aj = cooperatedefect if aj = defect (6.77)
=) From (6:77) ; we note that the outcome (defect; defect) constitutes a unique
NE for this game:
Thus having established this, we suppose that the game has already been played in
T   1 periods, and now rm i is ready to play for a nal time in period T . In this
case, the game is identical to a one shot game and its outcome is identical to that
which we have previously established, i.e. (defect; defect). Now, we consider the
game played in period T   1. Both rms know that after this period, they will have
one game to play and the outcome of this game would result in both playing defect.
Hence, at this period, they both would play their dominant startegy defect.
Using backward induction, we note that in each period T   2; T   3; :::; 1, defect will
be played by both players hence SPE.
//
B2: Given (29) and (30) from section 3.2, we show that deviation is not benecial for
rm 1 if
  A  C
A  S
by solving the inequality:
C
 1
1  

 S
A
S
+
1
1     1

, C
1    A  S +
S
1  
, C   S
1    A  S
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, C   S
A  S  1  
,   1  C   S
A  S
,   A  S   (C   S)
A  S
,   A  C
A  S
//
B3: Given (32) and (33) from section 3.2, we show that deviation is not benecial for
rm 1 under quasi-hyperbolic discounting if
  A  C
(C   S) + A  C :
C
 1

+
1
1     1

 A+ S
 1
1     1

, C
1     C + C 
S
1     S + A
, (C   S)
1    (C   S) + A  C
, (C   S)
(C   S) + A  C  1  
,   1  (C   S)
(C   S) + A  C
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,   (C   S) + A  C   [(C   S)]
(C   S) + A  C
,   A  C
(C   S) + A  C
//
B4: Given (34) in Section 3.2, we show that the following holds:
d
d
() < 0 (6.78)
If we substitute A C with  and C S with , we can restate () in the following
way:
() =
A  C
(C   S) + (A  C) =

 + 
=   1
 + 
Thus, we derive () with respect to  below:
d
d
=   d
d
 1
 + 

=   0   1  ( + )
0
( + )2
=    
( + )2
=   
( + )2
From section 3.1, we established the following relationship: A > C > S > Z.
Thus, we note that  > 0 and  > 0 since:
 = (A  C)| {z }
+
 = (C   S)| {z }
+
) (A  C)(C   S) > 0
implying:
  
( + )2
< 0 ,   (A  C)(C   S)
((C   S) + (A  C))2 < 0
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//
B5: Given (34) in Section 3.2, we show that the following holds:
d2
d2
() > 0 (6.79)
d2
d2
 A  C
(C   S) + A  C

=
d
d

  
( + )2

=   d
d
 1
( + )2

=  
0   2( + )1
( + )4

=      2( + )
( + )4
= 22   + 
( + )4
= 22
1
( + )3
> 0 , 2(A  C)(C   S)
2
((C   S) + (A  C))3 > 0
//
B5: Given (36) from Section 3.2, we show that the following holds:
A  C
A  S < 1
From section 3.1, we established the following relationship: A > C > S > Z. Thus,
A  C < A  S j  A
,  C <  S j ( )
, C > S
//
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6.3 Appendix C
C1: Figure 10 shows the trend over the past century of published articles on Science
Direct, one of the world's largest online collections of published scientic research
(key word: hyperbolic discounting).
Figure 10: Articles on hyperbolic discounting available on Science Direct
(1939-2009)
//
C2: The graphs in Figure 1 were plotted by Stata from data imported from Excel.
At time 0, the value of the payo equals 1 implying no discounting of the present.
For each subsequent period, i.e., t = 1; 2; :::, the value of the payo is equal to t.
The table below gives the output in excel. We set  at 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 although any
value in the range (0,1) would suce. In addition, we give the theoretical limit case
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wherein  = 1, implying zero discounting.
Figure 11: Excel output for Figure 1
//
C3: The graphs in Figure 2 were plotted by Stata from data imported from Excel.
At time 0, the value of the payo equals 1 implying no discounting of the present.
For each subsequent period, i.e., t = 1; 2; :::, the value of the payo is equal to t.
The table below gives the output in excel. We set  at 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 and  at 0.5,
0.7 and 0.9 respectively although for both parameters, any value in the range (0,1)
would suce. In addition, we give the theoretical limit case wherein  = 1 and  = 1,
implying zero discounting.
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Figure 12: Excel output for Figure 2
//
The graph in Figure 3 was plotted by Excel. At time 0, the value of the payo equals
1 implying no discounting of the present. For each subsequent period, i.e., t = 1; 2; :::,
the value of the payo is equal to 1
t
. Note that here t represents a unit time delay.
The table below gives the output in excel that generated the graph.
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Figure 13: Excel output for gure 3
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